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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
2(a)-3(2)(h) as this is an appeal from a final judgment 
and order in a domestic relations action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Has the Appellant marshalled all of the 
evidence and, despite such evidence, demonstrated that 
the Trial Court's distribution of property was clearly 
erroneous or an abuse of discretion? 
2. In Arguendo, did the Trial Court err in 
determining that the premarital portion of the McGinty 
Ranch was a joint venture between the parties and, 
therefore, the Court equally divided the premarital 
portion. 
3. With respect to that portion of the ranch 
acquired during the marriage, should the Trial Court have 
utilized the presumption of equal distribution and, from 
the evidence, determined that each of the parties had 
contributed substantial time and money to the ranch such 
as to justify an equal distribution? 
4. Does any legal authority exist which would 
justify a pro rata distribution of the ranch and, even 
if such authority existed, would it be utilized when 
Appellant relies upon misstatements of fact as a basis 
for his argument? 
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5. Is the appeal frivolous and intended to 
delay a recovery of the ranch from the defaulting buyer 
so as to deprive the Appellee of her portion of the 
proceeds and, if so, is she entitled to an award of her 
costs and attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As more fully discussed in Point I of the 
Argument, the sound discretion of a Trial Court in the 
distribution of property will not be overturned unless 
it is clearly erroneous or a clear abuse of discretion. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; also see 
authorities cited in Point I of this brief. 
With respect to Issue 5, Appellee urges this 
Court to award her costs and attorney's fee on this 
appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure which confers original determination of the 
merits of the appeal to this Court. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
With the exception of the Rules previously 
cited, there are no statutory or constitutional 
provisions that are determinative of the issues on appeal 
in this case. 
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RECORD ON APPEAL 
References to the Trial Transcript will be made 
as follows: (TT ) . Such reference will be utilized 
because the District Court Clerk did not paginate the 
Trial Transcript. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand 
County, State of Utah. The case at bar was tried before 
the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on the 11th day of June, 
1993. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision (Addendum 
A) on June 18, 1993. After several motions, the Court 
entered its Findings of Fact (hereafter "FF"), 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on August 11, 
1993 (Addendum B) . Plaintiff/Appellant filed Notice of 
Appeal in the present case on September 3, 1993 (ROA 369-
370) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee offers the following statement of 
relevant facts in the present case: 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "Cotton") and the Defendant/Appellee 
(hereinafter referred to as "Lee") met in 1963 in Saudi 
Arabia at a time when both were employed by the Arabian 
American Oil Company ("ARAMCO"). (FF 3). 
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2. A romance blossomed almost immediately but 
marriage was not possible because of the nepotism 
policies of ARAMCO and because Lee, a devout Catholic, 
could not marry Cotton unless the church granted a 
dispensation pertaining to Cotton's earlier divorce (TT 
147-149; FF 3). 
3. After approximately seven (7) years of 
working on the dispensation, it was finally received in 
late 1975 (TT 151-152; FF 3). 
4. Both of the parties were also in the 
process of retiring from ARAMCO so that the nepotism 
policies of the company would no longer prevent their 
marriage (FF 3)• 
5. The parties were married on June 18, 1976 
at Palo Alto, California and immediately moved to the 
McGinty ranch in Castle Valley, Utah (FF 2) . The marriage 
was Lee's first and Cotton's second marriage, 
6. Almost from the beginning of their 
relationship, Cotton and Lee had planned to spend their 
lives together (TT 154-155). While in Saudi Arabia, the 
parties could not marry because of the nepotism policies 
of ARAMCO (TT 149-150; FF 3) and they could not live 
together because of the cultural problems that could have 
subjected Lee to "stoning" (TT 150-151), but the parties 
maintained a close personal relationship and planned for 
their future (TT 154-157). 
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7. By the late 1960's, Lee and Cotton were 
searching for investment properties to provide them both 
with future retirement monies and a retirement home (TT 
154-155; FF 7). 
8. From the late 1960's until the time of the 
parties' marriage in 1976, Lee consistently provided 
Cotton with monies to be utilized in the acquisition of 
joint venture properties and a retirement home in the 
belief that the parties would ultimately marry and retire 
together (FF 7). 
9. Although approximately $3,000.00 was 
transferred by Lee to Cotton for investment purposes 
prior to 1970 (TT 154), Lee's documentary evidence was 
vague during this time period (TT 154). 
10. Both parties made numerous trips to the 
Grand County, Utah area for purposes of locating 
investment and/or retirement properties and, on one such 
trip in 1970, Cotton located what would become known as 
the McGinty ranch (TT 154-157). 
11. Since Lee was still in Saudi Arabia at 
that time, she made plans for immediate transfers of 
funds to Cotton for the purpose of completing the 
$10,000.00 down payment on the McGinty ranch in December 
of 1970. She transferred a total of $6,200.00 to him for 
that purpose. (TT 180; Exhibit 9; FF 7). 
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12. After transferring $6,200.00 for the 
original down payment, Lee continued to transfer sums of 
money into Cotton's accounts to facilitate the operation 
and improvement of the ranch (TT 181; FF 7, 8, 9 and 10) . 
13. Cotton held title to the McGinty ranch, 
as well as various other parcels of joint venture 
property, as trustee for the partnership, and he 
collected all rents and income from the investment 
properties and returned same into the development of the 
properties (TT 181-192; FF 10). 
14. Both of the parties made numerous trips 
to Utah and utilized the McGinty ranch as their home in 
the United States prior to the time of their marriage (TT 
155-157). 
15. The ranch earned approximately $5,000.00 
per year from the time of its acquisition in 1970 until 
the time of the parties' marriage in 1976 and all of that 
income was utilized to make payments on the ranch and 
improve the property (TT 43, 83). 
16. Following the purchase of the ranch, Lee 
continued to transfer funds to Cotton in the sums of at 
least $1,800.00 in June of 1971 (TT 182) for a payment 
on the ranch, $1,500.25 in March of 1972 (TT 186-189) for 
the acquisition of the Brown/Terry property which would 
ultimately become the Jenks property, and $7,000.00 in 
6 
1973 (TT 189-192) for the acquisition of the Miller 
property (FF 7) . 
17. In September of 1976, the Miller property 
was sold and Lee received one-half (h) of the proceeds 
from the sale, namely $9,965.30, all of which she 
deposited back into the family accounts (TT 191-192). 
18. The Brown/Terry property was subsequently 
sold to Mr. Jenks in 1988 and both Lee and Cotton 
executed documents for the sale. They received 
approximately $33,000.00 from Mr. Jenks over a two and 
one-half (2^) year time period and all of the proceeds 
were deposited into the ranch and household accounts (TT 
188-189) . 
19. Prior to her marriage in 1976, Lee also 
utilized her personal funds to purchase furniture and 
appliances for the ranch house and caused same to be 
delivered to the ranch house so that it would be 
functional by the time the parties arrived to set up 
house hold (TT 157-158) (FF 7). 
20. As of the date of their marriage in June 
of 1976, Lee had substantial cash savings in excess of 
$35,000.00 (TT 164-179, 194-198) and Cotton had no cash 
savings (TT 87-89, 198). 
21. Following the date of the marriage, each 
of the parties contributed their social security checks 
and pension checks into their joint ranch and family 
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accounts (TT 192-195), and all of the monthly payments 
for the ranch from the date of the marriage until the 
payoff of the ranch in 1983 came from those accounts (FF 
8). 
22. Immediately preceding the payoff of the 
ranch, Lee withdrew $15,000.00 from her sole and separate 
premarital accounts and deposited said sum into the joint 
ranch account so that Cotton could write check #1437 on 
September 23, 1983 in the sum of $13,638.47 to pay off 
the entire remaining balance on the McGinty ranch (TT 
199-204; Exhibits 36, 37, 38 and 39 [Addendum D] ; FF 8). 
23. Following their marriage, the parties made 
substantial improvements to the ranch including the 
remodeling of the ranch house and bunk house, the 
installation of a piped irrigation system and the 
doubling of hay production. They also acquired additional 
equipment for the operation of the ranch (TT 132; FF 9). 
24. The parties frequently listed the ranch 
for sale in an attempt to realize a significant return 
on their investment and, Cotton acted as though Lee were 
a joint owner of the ranch by having her sign and 
participate in all listing agreements and deeds for the 
sale of portions of the property, like the Jenks property 
(TT 135-136, 238; FF 10). 
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25. Lee utilized much of her pre-marital 
savings to improve and make lump sum payments on the 
ranch (TT 208,213). 
26. Lee was never repaid for any of the 
transfers of money that went into the McGinty ranch or 
the Jenks property and she placed all of her return from 
the Miller property back into the ranch accounts (TT 189, 
191-192, 199-203; FF 7). 
27. The ranch was purchased in 1970 for 
$80,000.00 and was worth $425,000.00 at the time of 
trial. Though most of the appreciation had occurred in 
the two (2) years prior to the trial and was due to 
recent market increases, marital improvements also 
effected the value of the ranch (TT 129-132; FF 7). 
28. Cotton filed for divorce on December 26, 
1991 (ROA 1). 
29. Cotton's attorney drafted a restraining 
order against the disposition of any property during the 
pendency of the action which was in full force and effect 
at the time that Cotton sold the ranch to Darr Hatch (FF 
12) . 
30. Without notifying attorney Sandy Dolowitz, 
trial counsel for Cotton, Cotton accompanied Darr Hatch 
to Utah County so that Mr. Hatch's law firm could prepare 
the documents which transferred ownership of the ranch 
to Mr. Hatch pursuant to a Contract of Sale. Cotton and 
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Hatch also contended the sale included all of the 
household goods, farm equipment and vehicles that had 
been previously owned by Cotton and Lee, although no 
inventories were included on the sales contract and no 
security interests in the personal property were ever 
perfected (TT 100-110, 117-124). 
31. On June 11, 1993 trial was held and Judge 
Anderson received testimony and numerous exhibits. He 
entered his Memorandum Decision (Addendum A) on June 18, 
1993 and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce were entered on August 11, 1993 (Addendum B). 
32. At the time of trial, Darr Hatch was 
substantially delinquent in the payments on the ranch 
and Cotton had made no attempt whatsoever to collect the 
past due payments or foreclose on the property (TT 108-
110) . 
33. At the time of trial, Cotton contended 
that he had no vehicle left but was driving a little red 
sports car "on loan" from Darr Hatch. (TT 102). 
34. As of the time of this appeal, the 
defaulting buyer remains in possession of the property 
although no payments whatsoever have been made since the 
time of the trial. All attempts to remove the defaulting 
buyer from the property have been met with delaying 
tactics by Cotton and counsel. (Affidavit of Counsel, 
Addendum C)• 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lee contends that Cotton has failed to meet the 
standard of review required in this case. He has failed 
to present any legal basis for an appeal and he has not 
even attempted to marshal 1 all of the evidence that 
supported the Trial Courtis Findings. As such, this Court 
should refuse to consider his attack upon the Trial 
Court'& distribution of property. 
In Arguendo, Lee contends that the Court 
applied the correct legal standard and first determined 
that the premarital portion of the McGinty ranch was 
really a joint venture between the parties. Since the 
parties had several joint venture properties, all in 
Cotton's name, the Court had ample evidence to support 
its determination that the parties had functioned 
together as a joint venture partnership. The Court's 
equal distribution of the premarital portion of the ranch 
was in conformity with that Finding of Fact. 
The Court further determined that payment for 
the marital portion of the McGinty ranch had come from 
the joint monies and efforts of the parties. The Court 
found that Lee McGinty had withdrawn $15,000.00 of her 
premarital money and deposited same into the joint ranch 
account so that Selva McGinty could write check number 
1437 on September 23, 1983 in the sum of $13,638.47 to 
pay off the entire remaining balance on the McGinty 
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ranch. Applying the presumption favoring an equal 
distribution between married persons, the Court then 
divided the marital portion of the McGinty ranch on a 
fifty-fifty (50/50) basis. Such a division is in complete 
conformity with all current caselaw. 
By contrast, Cotton argues this Court to make 
a pro rata distribution of the ranch. He ignores the 
Court's Findings of Fact, argues only one (1) side of 
disputed testimony and blatantly misrepresents facts to 
this Court. His argument for a pro rata distribution 
rests solely upon erroneous mathematics concerning the 
source of the funds which made the payments on the 
McGinty ranch. 
Finally, Lee asks this Court to award costs and 
attorney's fee on the grounds that this appeal has been 
frivolous and has been intended solely to delay the 
recovery of the ranch from Cotton's friend, the 
defaulting buyer, in a collusive attempt to deny Lee her 
share of the marital proceeds. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND, DESPITE 
SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER 
AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court's numerous and express Findings 
of Fact in the case at bar should be reviewed in light 
of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
Rule 52: Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury..., the 
court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A;...Findings of Fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, 
to the extent that the court adopts 
them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence 
or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court... 
[Emphasis added by Order of the Utah 
Supreme Court on October 30, 1986 and 
became effective on January 1, 1987. ] 
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 
52(a) demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the 
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facts of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce 
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts has been 
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche. v. Riche. 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App 1989); Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 
922 (Utah App 1992); Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah App 1989); Mvers v. Myers. 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App 
1989); Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
Appellate Courts have traditionally granted great 
deference to the Trial Court,s Findings of Fact and do 
not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Additionally Appellate Courts have traditionally deferred 
to the Trial Court for purposes of judging the 
credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioii, supra; Riche, supra. 
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated: 
Husband, in his brief on appeal, 
refers this court to evidence which 
conflicts with the trial court's 
findings and supports his contention 
that he should have been awarded 
custody of the four children. 
However, Husband does not "marshal 
the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be xagainst the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them *clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 
776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 
P.2d at 193) . See also Scharf v. BMG 
Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); Harker v. Condominiums Forest 
Glen, Inc. , 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we decline 
to further consider Husband's attack 
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on the court's findings as to 
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). 
In Shioii, the Supreme Court has also expressly 
provided: 
On appeal from a judgment of the 
Trial Court, our [Appellate Court] 
role is not to substitute our own 
findings for those of the Trial 
Court, but to examine the record for 
evidence supporting the judgment. 
(Shioii. supra, at 201.) 
[Emphasis added] 
Given that express statement of the role of the 
Appellate Court, the Appellant is charged with the 
responsibility of (1) marshalling all the evidence in 
support of the Findings, and (2) demonstrating that 
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
In the case at bar, Cotton has failed to 
present any of the evidence upon which the judge based 
his very detailed Findings. Instead, he has chosen to 
make conclusionary statements, many of which are flagrant 
misrepresentations of the actual testimony, and has 
further chosen to base those conclusionary statements on 
only his side of the disputed testimony. For example, in 
paragraph 8 of the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court 
finds "that the remaining debt on the ranch of 
approximately $14,000.00 was paid off in 1983 with Lee's 
separate funds". The Court's Findings of Fact were based 
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upon detailed testimony by Lee tracing her sole and 
separate funds through various certificates of deposit 
into the ranch account for the sole purpose of paying off 
the ranch (TT pages 199 through 203). In addition to her 
testimony, Lee introduced into evidence each document 
that demonstrated every transfer of money from its origin 
in her pre-marital account to the exact check which paid 
off the ranch in the total sum of $13,638.47. By 
comparison, Cotton directs you to pages 46 and 47 of the 
Trial Transcript and asserts that those pages will 
demonstrate that Cotton paid Lee back $9,111.00. A review 
of those pages indicates that no such statement was ever 
made and that Cotton was confused and disoriented and 
had no documentation whatsoever for most of the 
statements he made. Cross-examination on those issues (TT 
96-97) clearly demonstrated that Cotton had no memory of 
the events surrounding the final payoff of the ranch and 
no documentation of any alleged repayment to Lee. He 
couldn't remember the payoff amount for the ranch, where 
the money came from, how it got into the joint account 
to make the ranch payment, or how much money, if any, had 
ever been paid back to Lee. By contrast, Lee testified 
that she had never received any repayment of the funds 
which paid off the ranch nor did she ever expect any. 
Yet in Cotton's brief, this highly disputed and 
inconsistent testimony was ignored and only a small 
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portion of Cotton's contradictory and self-serving 
testimony was included in his brief. It was also 
presented to this Court as though it had been fact 
(Paragraph 21, Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief, 
page 7) , and check number 1437 from the ranch account was 
included in Appellant's Brief (Addendum D) but Lee's 
withdrawal (Exhibit 36) from her separate account and 
her deposit to the ranch account (Exhibit 37) were 
ignored. 
An additional example of presenting disputed 
evidence as though it were fact occurs when Cotton makes 
the representation that Lee received $9,965.30 from the 
sale of the Miller property (Appellant's Brief, page 6, 
Statement of Facts, Paragraph 13) but fails to point out 
that the testimony and documentary evidence clearly 
established that all of those funds were deposited back 
into the family's joint personal and ranch accounts and 
were utilized for the support of the family and for 
improvements and general operating funds for the ranch 
(TT 191-192). 
Appellant's burden of proof requires that he 
marshall, not ignore, the evidence which supports the 
Trial Court's ruling. In the case at bar, Appellant has 
presented only isolated portions of confusing and 
contradictory disputed testimony. Since he has failed to 
meet his burden of proof for Appellate review, Appellee 
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urges this Court to renew the position which it stated 
in Riche, supra, and declined to further consider 
Appellant's attack on the Trial Court's Findings with 
respect to property distribution. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE PRE-MARITAL PORTION OF THE 
MCGINTY RANCH WAS A JOINT VENTURE AND, AS SUCH, DIVIDED 
THE PRE-MARITAL INTEREST EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Trial Courts have always had considerable 
discretion in determining the financial interests of 
divorced parties. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
App. 1990). A property distribution between parties in 
a divorce action should be done in a fair and systematic 
fashion. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Burt, supra, this Court noted that the Trial Court 
should first properly categorize the parties' property 
as part of the marital estate or as separate property. 
The Court also pointed out that each party is presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and 
50% of the marital property. Burt, supra at 1172. 
In the case at bar, the distribution of the 
Trial Court is entitled to a presumption of validity and 
should not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous 
or an abuse of discretion. Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 
1055 (Utah App), cert, denied, 756 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Applying those standards to the case at bar, 
an examination of the Trial Court's analysis indicates 
that the Court separated the pre-marital interests of the 
parties from the marital interests. The Court made 
express Findings about the expectations and contributions 
of each of the parties to the McGinty Ranch prior to the 
date of their marriage on June 18, 1976. The Court found 
that the parties began looking for a retirement home and 
retirement investments during the late 1960's. (FF 7) . 
The Court emphasized Lee's testimony with respect to the 
conversations and agreements between she and Cotton about 
the acquisition of various parcels of real estate for 
investment and also the acquisition of real estate for 
their future marital home. (TT 154, 155, 181). Lee 
provided detailed testimony, supported by documentary 
evidence, of her deposits to Cotton's accounts to 
purchase not only the ranch but, also, other joint 
investment properties such as the Miller property (TT 
190-192) and the Brown/Terry property (TT 188-189) which 
ultimately becomes the Jenks property (TT 186-187). The 
Court completely discounted Cotton's testimony about the 
alleged repayment of those transfers of money from Lee 
because he could not provide any supporting documents for 
his claims and because his testimony had been totally 
contradictory. Judging the credibility of witnesses was 
solely the discretion and prerogative of the Trial Court. 
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The Trial Court made a decision to rely upon Lee's 
detailed knowledge and documentary evidence rather than 
Cotton's confused, disoriented and spiteful testimony. 
The Trial Court's reasoning is spelled out clearly in 
very specific Findings of Fact (FF 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
15) . After reconciling all of the evidence, the Court 
found that the ranch was a joint venture before the 
marriage and a marital asset during the marriage (FF 10) . 
Although Cotton's name was the only name on the title to 
the ranch, the Court expressly refused to find that the 
ranch was his sole and separate property or that it was 
his pre-marital asset (FF 10) . The Court's Finding was 
based upon substantial evidence about the agreements of 
the parties concerning their mutual investments in 
several properties. In each case, Lee had transferred 
funds into Cotton's accounts and Cotton had purchased the 
property in his name. (TT 182-203). Cotton received all 
of the rents and/or incomes generated by the properties 
and utilized same to make payments and maintain the 
properties as the trustee of the joint venture 
investments. When a joint venture property was disposed 
of, such as the Miller property, Lee was always given 
one-half of the total return from the property although 
she always invested all of her proceeds back into the 
marriage and marital accounts. From this testimony, the 
Court entered a Finding that Lee had contributed 
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significant sums of money to the acquisition and payment 
of the ranch prior to the date of marriage. (FF 7, 8, 
10) . One example of the transfer of funds centered on the 
original down payment of the ranch. Contrary to the 
misstatement of fact in Appellant's Brief, Lee's 
testimony and the documentary evidence established that 
all of the original $6,200.00 which was paid as a down 
payment by the parties toward the ranch in December of 
1970 came from Lee's accounts. Even Cotton had to 
acknowledge the transfer of three (3) separate amounts 
from Lee's accounts into Cotton's personal checking 
account. He admitted that the transfers had occurred and 
his check ledger, in his own handwriting, reflects that 
the funds came from Lee. (TT 70 - 74). In short, at the 
time of the execution of the Ernest Money Agreement, more 
of the money for the original $10,000.00 down payment 
came from Lee than from Cotton. Additionally, the Court 
received sworn testimony that Cotton was the only party 
who was present in the United States for purposes of 
executing the contract as Lee was still in the middle 
east. The transfers and the documentary evidence also 
establish that Lee was overseas at the time the documents 
were actually signed for the acquisition of the ranch. 
(TT 70-74 and the exhibits associated therewith). Lee 
testified that Cotton held ownership to many of the 
properties and that she trusted him explicitly as trustee 
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for their future plans. (TT 155). After the initial 
$10,000.00 down payment, the evidence showed that the 
ranch began earning its own income and, even Cotton 
admitted that when the first annual payment of more than 
$20,000.00 came due, the ranch had actually earned part 
of that next payment. (TT 182 - 183) . Since Lee had 
contributed substantially to the original down payment 
and was an equitable owner in the joint venture, she was 
also entitled to credit for her share of the rents and 
proceeds which had been earned by the ranch. Those rents 
and proceeds were always reinvested back into the 
payments and the taxes on the ranch. (TT 83). 
The Court also received testimony about 
transfers of money from Lee to Cotton for improvements 
to the ranch, the acquisition of appliances and 
furnishings for the ranch and funds for other joint 
venture properties. (TT 154, 157, 158, 179-192). Having 
received said testimony, the Court entered a Finding that 
"Lee contributed to the acquisition and the maintenance 
of the ranch both before and during the marriage and that 
she did so utilizing her own money as well as her 
efforts." (FF 9) . The Court further found that before the 
marriage Lee had also made substantial contributions by 
way of maintenance, preservation and protection of the 
ranch in addition to her substantial contributions of her 
sole and separate funds. (FF 10). The Court also found 
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"Lee has demonstrated that she provided the funds for 
half of the lump sum payments and the Court finds that 
the installment payments ultimately came from joint 
funds." (FF 10). 
The Trial Court had before it forty-four (44) 
exhibits, the majority of which were presented by Lee. 
Those exhibits support the Court's Findings of Fact. By 
comparison, the Plaintiff offered almost nothing. After 
a thorough examination of the supporting documentation 
and the preparation of a detailed set of Findings of 
Fact, the Trial Court concluded that the pre-marital 
portion of the McGinty ranch was a joint venture between 
these parties and awarded each of them fifty (50%) 
percent. The Court also had before it documentation that 
showed that the parties had other joint venture 
properties such as the Miller property and the Jenks 
property. In each case, Cotton held the property in his 
name but substantial funds had come from Lee for the 
acquisition of the property. When each of those 
properties were sold, Lee was given fifty (50%) percent 
of the gain, evidencing her equitable ownership interest 
in the property. When the funds came from the sale of 
the Miller property and the Jenks property, Lee 
contributed all of her funds back into the ranch without 
ever reimbursing her sole and separate accounts for the 
original monies which she had expended for the 
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acquisition of the joint venture properties. The Court's 
Findings were based upon solid and consistent evidence. 
Absent a clear abuse of discretion or evidence that the 
Findings were clearly erroneous, the Appellate Court 
should affirm the Trial Court's findings. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
MARITAL PORTION OF THE PROPERTY WHICH SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Both the Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme 
Court have long held that once a Court has determined 
that something is marital property, the Court may 
distribute it equitably, not withstanding which party's 
name appears on the title. Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1980); Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
App. 1988) ; Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah App 
1993). In Jackson, supra, the Supreme Court stated, "the 
Trial Court is empowered to make such distributions as 
are just and equitable and may compel such conveyances 
as are necessary to that end." In Burt, supra, the Court 
held that each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty 
(50%) percent of the marital property unless unusual 
circumstances require otherwise. (See also Watson v. 
Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992). 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court had already 
determined that the pre-marital interest in the ranch was 
that of a joint venture between the two (2) parties. 
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Irrespective of the fact that Cotton held title to the 
property in a trust capacity for the joint venture, the 
Court looked for further indications that the parties 
continued to deal with the property as a joint asset. The 
Court entered a Finding that the payments made on the 
ranch from the time of the marriage until the time of 
final payment were made from accounts into which each 
party deposited his or her social security checks and 
retirement benefits (192-202). The evidence also showed 
that the parties worked hand-in-hand to improve and 
beautify the ranch (TT 132-133, 198-199, 239). Lee 
testified about remodeling and decorating the ranch 
house, the bunk house and the yard. Lee described 
participating in planting fields and installing 
irrigation lines. Her testimony was supported by 
witnesses Joe Kingsley and Mr. Jenks. Lee also provided 
all of the accounting and bookkeeping services for the 
ranch. (FF 8) . The Court entered a Finding that the money 
that paid off the ranch in the sum of almost $14,000.00 
came exclusively from Lee's sole and separate funds (FF 
8) . The Court further entered Findings that during the 
marriage Lee had utilized her own separate money, all of 
her retirement funds and income and all of her efforts 
in improving the ranch and, due to Lee's substantial 
contributions, both before and during the marriage, she 
had enhanced the value of the ranch (FF 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) . 
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The Court also entered an express Finding that the course 
of conduct between the parties evidenced a joint 
ownership of the property. (FF 10) . Joe Kingsley, a local 
realtor testified that Cotton had always listed Lee's 
name on any listing agreements concerning the sale of the 
ranch. He further testified that the parties showed the 
ranch together and had actually disposed of a portion of 
the ranch, namely, the Jenks property, by mutual 
agreement. The entire testimony of witness Kingsley 
supports the Court's Findings of Fact. 
Based upon the Court's very specific Findings 
of Fact, the reasoning evidenced by same and the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, the Court then 
ordered the ranch sold and the proceeds divided equally 
between the parties. 
A review of the entire property distribution 
will also show that the Court awarded Cotton the entire 
marital savings account and the funds that he had removed 
from same even though he had removed the funds in 
violation of the Court's prior order (FF 18). The Court 
entered a Finding that Cotton should have the account, 
even though it is marital property, "in order to foster 
an equitable distribution of all of the assets of the 
parties". Even if there had been some minor discrepancy 
in the amounts paid by each of the parties before the 
marriage, awarding Cotton the entire family savings 
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account, including the sums he had withdrawn in violation 
of the Court order, more than equalled any additional 
payments he claimed to have made prior to the marriage. 
Since the Trial Court has followed the 
presumption that marital property should be equally 
divided and since the Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
any abuse of discretion and has also failed to marshall 
all of the evidence in support of the Court's Findings 
and then demonstrate, in light of that evidence, that the 
Findings are clearly erroneous, the Trial Court's 
distribution of marital property should be affirmed. 
IV 
APPELLANT URGES A PRO RATA DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
PROPERTY WHICH IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESUMPTIONS 
CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED BY CASE LAW. 
In the event this Court determines that the 
McGinty ranch is marital property, then Appellant urges 
this Court to divide the property based upon the pro rata 
contribution of each. First, it should be noted that 
Appellant cites no case law at all in support of his 
argument. Second, most of the reasoning contained in 
Appellant's argument is based upon erroneous or misstated 
facts. Current case law makes it clear that marital 
property should be distributed on an equal basis unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, 
require otherwise. Burt, supra at 1172; Hall, supra at 
1022; Watson, supra at 5. Given a clear presumption in 
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favor of equally dividing marital property, the Trial 
Court has not found any unusual circumstances that would 
justify overriding the presumption of equality between 
the parties. A review of the accurate facts indicates 
that Cotton did not pay $30,000.00 of the original 
$80,000.00 purchase price prior to the marriage of the 
parties. The facts established that Lee provided sixty 
(60%) percent of the original down payment, one-half of 
all of the accumulated rents and proceeds that were 
placed back into the ranch after its acquisition and 
various other sums of money which were transferred into 
Cotton's accounts from 1970 until the time of the 
parties' marriage. The exhibits demonstrated to the Trial 
Court that a flow of cash from Lee's personal accounts 
into Cotton's accounts occurred on a steady basis. Cotton 
admitted most of those transfers during his testimony. 
Based upon Appellant's argument, Lee would have been a 
sixty (60%) percent owner of the ranch as of the date of 
the execution of the Ernest Money Agreement. The ranch 
then started earning its own income and that income was 
contributed into the next annual payment. Lee is 
certainly entitled to a portion of the earned income for 
her partnership interest. Cotton contributed the 
remaining balance of the first annual payment which would 
have been the sum of approximately $15,000.00. The ranch 
then continued to earn approximately $5,000.00 a year 
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and, from its earnings, made its monthly payments and 
paid the taxes. The Court entered a Finding that the 
parties were equal owners in a joint venture agreement 
and the evidence demonstrates an almost fifty-fifty 
(50/50) ownership in the McGinty ranch prior to the date 
of the marriage. Cotton's argument completely disregards 
the fact that all of the monthly payments and earnings 
from the ranch were as much Lee's acquired income as 
Cotton's. It also ignores the fact that numerous checks 
to pay for the ranch and the improvements to the ranch 
had been funded by transfers from Lee's accounts. 
Cotton then makes a representation to this 
Court that Lee was repaid the sum of $9,111.00. He 
further asserts that the Defendant never denied the 
repayment of that sum of money. Recognizing that counsel 
on appeal was not the trial counsel in this matter, it 
must be assumed that these statements were unintentional 
misrepresentations. In reality, Lee expressly denied the 
repayment to her of any of the $13,637.47 that paid off 
the ranch (TT 199 - 203) . The Court also entered a 
Finding based upon the evidence that the payoff of the 
ranch came solely from Lee's pre-marital funds. Cotton 
merely asserts a sum of money in pages 46 and 47 of the 
Trial Transcript which, when added, total $9,111.00. But 
he fails to point out that during his cross-examination, 
he admitted that he could remember any of the details, 
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including any amounts of money that may have been repaid 
to Lee. He further admits that he has no documentation 
whatsoever for his allegations of repayment (96-97). The 
Court obviously disregarded Cotton's testimony with good 
reason. 
Cotton made numerous assertions at trial which 
were not supported by any evidence. He even alleged that 
he made all of the monthly payments on the ranch after 
the marriage; however, the overwhelming weight of 
evidence showed that all of Lee's social security checks, 
retirement pension checks and considerable sums from her 
sole and separate account flowed into the personal and 
ranch accounts for the day-to-day operation of the ranch 
and the Court so found (FF 7 and 8). Of particular note 
is the fact that Lee provided detailed evidence to the 
Court as to her cash assets, which were substantial, at 
the time of her marriage to Cotton, while Cotton himself 
admitted that he had no cash assets at the time of the 
marriage. The testimony also established that 
considerable improvements were made to the ranch after 
the time of the parties' marriage. Obviously the funds 
for the ranch improvement had to come from either marital 
income or Lee's sole and separate funds. 
The Court found that much of the value of the 
ranch had come from recent (during the marriage) 
appreciation of the property (FF 9) . This Finding is 
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based upon the testimony of witness Joe Kingsley, a local 
real estate broker, who listed the McGinty ranch for many 
years. The testimony established that the ranch had not 
appreciated much in value from the time it was acquired 
in 1970 until the time of the parties' marriage in 1976 
but that the majority of appreciation had occurred during 
the last couple of years of the marriage due to dramatic 
economic changes in the Grand County area (TT 132)• The 
Court's Finding was intended to show that much of the 
appreciation of the ranch had occurred during the time 
of the marriage and, while it was based upon the mutual 
efforts of the parties, it was also based upon the 
fortuitous economic climate. Certainly Lee was as much 
entitled to that fortuitous economic increase on her 
investment as was Cotton on his. 
Finally, Cotton's arguments with respect to 
the contributions made by each of the parties are 
inaccurate. Even if one ignores the Court's express 
Findings of Fact with respect to the contributions from 
each of the parties, an examination of the Trial 
Transcript would provide the following undisputed 
evidence from the testimony: (1) Lee contributed 
$6,200.00 of the original $10,000.00 toward the purchase 
of the ranch by depositing same directly into Cotton's 
accounts so that he could write the down payment check; 
(2) Lee is entitled to be credited with at least one-half 
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(h) of the earnings of the ranch from the time of its 
purchase until the date of the marriage in 1976 as she 
had an express equitable ownership interest, and the 
ranch earned approximately $5,000.00 per year and all of 
the money went back into the ranch; (3) amounts of 
$1,500.25 and $1,800.00 were transferred from Lee to 
Cotton just prior to the time of the second annual 
payment; (4) from the date of the parties' marriage, all 
of Lee/s social security checks and retirement income 
went into the family and ranch accounts as did Cotton's 
and those accounts were used to make all of the monthly 
payments on the ranch; (5) Lee conveyed substantial 
amounts of money for the purchase of furniture and 
appliances for the ranch prior to the time of her 
marriage; (6) Lee entered into the marriage with 
substantial cash holdings while Cotton had none; (7) all 
of the almost $14,000.00 final payoff of the ranch came 
directly from Lee. In short, if one totals the figures 
outlined above, Lee had more of an interest in the ranch 
than did Cotton; however, due to the mutual efforts of 
these parties and the continual contributions over the 
years, the Court favored the presumption that marital 
property should be awarded equally to the parties. The 
Court then compensated any possible pre-marital interest 
to Cotton by awarding him all of the $16,000.00 family 
savings account. When the entire property distribution 
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is considered, the Trial Court's distribution is in 
compliance with the caselaw, with the presumption of 
equal distribution and with the facts as they actually 
exist in the record. 
V 
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEE 
ON APPEAL. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous 
appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made 
or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as 
in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the 
damages be paid by the party or by 
the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of 
these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify or reverse existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed 
for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper. 
Lee requests that she be awarded her costs and 
attorney's fee on this appeal on the grounds that the 
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appeal is frivolous and without merit and was intended 
solely to delay the resale of the ranch. Even though the 
Trial Court did not award costs and attorney's fee at 
the trial level, this Court has made it clear that it has 
the authority to award costs and attorney's fee under 
appropriate circumstances. Riche. supra. The recent 
substantial revisions of Rule 33 define a frivolous 
appeal as one that is not grounded in fact or warranted 
by existing law or which is interposed for purposes of 
delay. In Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court stated that a husband's appeal from a 
judgment relating to the distribution of marital property 
was frivolous where there was no basis for the argument 
presented and the evidence and law were mis-characterized 
and misstated. 
In the case at bar# a review of the testimony 
of Darr Morrell Hatch, Jr., the defaulting buyer of the 
McGinty ranch, and Cotton McGinty will show a collusive 
relationship intended to deprive Lee of her share of the 
marital property. Cotton's actions in intentionally 
circumventing his trial counsel to sell the McGinty ranch 
in clear violation of the existing restraining order was 
found to be an intentional contempt of court (FF 12, 20) . 
Since the time of Mr. Hatch's testimony, not one 
additional payment has been made on the property (See 
Affidavit of Counsel, Addendum C, Appellee's Brief). 
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Additionally, Lee's attempts to regain control of the 
property from the defaulting buyer and proceed with the 
resale of the ranch have been blocked by endless delays 
and lack of cooperation by Cotton and the appeal has 
created a cloud on title that makes the resale of the 
ranch impossible (See Affidavit of Counsel, Addendum C, 
Appellee's Brief)* 
Appellant has failed to provide this Court with 
any rational basis for overturning the Trial Court's 
decision. It does not even attempt to marshall the 
evidence in support of the Court's Findings and then 
argue that the Trial Court's Findings are clearly 
erroneous or an abuse of discretion. Further, Cotton has 
argued only disputed facts to this Court and has not only 
ignored evidence that supported the Trial Court Findings 
but has failed to even point same out to the Court and 
has, on occasion, misrepresented facts. Finally, Cotton 
has failed to provide this Court with any legal theory 
that would give it grounds for overturning the Trial 
Court or to provide any caselaw that would support his 
proposed pro rata distribution. Such "lack of meritorious 
issues supports Lee's contention that the sole purpose 
of this appeal was to delay the disposition and resale 
of the ranch as directed by the Court. 
A review of Cotton's actions throughout the 
trial indicates the extent to which he will go to keep 
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Lee from getting her share of the proceeds from the sale 
of the ranch. In violation of an express Court order, and 
circumventing his trial counsel Sandy Dolowitz, Cotton 
accompanied Mr. Hatch to Mr. Hatch's counsel's office in 
Utah County for the purpose of selling the ranch in 
violation of the restraining order that was in place 
during the pendency of the action (TT 100-110, 118-122) . 
Cotton received a $25,000.00 payment from Mr. Hatch but 
did not disclose same to his counsel until it was 
discovered accidentally by Lee and a Motion for Order to 
Show Cause in Contempt had to be filed in order to force 
the disclosure of the sale agreement and freeze the 
proceeds from the ranch (ROA 97 and 98) . The sale 
purported to convey every piece of household furniture, 
the vehicles, the farm equipment and all other personal 
property owned by the parties even though the contract 
did not have an inventory list and no security agreement 
was ever perfected with respect to the personal property 
(TT 100-110, 118-122) . Since the date of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce, anything concerning the attempted 
recovery of the property from the defaulting buyer has 
been met with continued delay and acts intended to 
subvert the Trial Court's order. (Affidavit of Counsel, 
Addendum C, Appellee's Brief). 
As in the Eames case, Lee contends that Cotton 
has presented no basis in law for this Court to consider 
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overturning the Trial Court's decision and his appeal is 
based on evidence and/or law which has been mis-
characterized or completely misstated. It genuinely 
appears that the current appeal exists for the sole 
purpose of thwarting Lee's attempts to regain control of 
the ranch and re-market same. Both parties to this action 
are elderly people and such delays could clearly deprive 
Lee of any enjoyment of her share of the proceeds from 
the sale of the ranch. Additionally, from the minor 
assets Lee received at the Trial Court level, she has 
incurred substantial costs and attorney's fees in 
responding to this appeal and, therefore, she requests 
that this Court find that the current appeal is without 
merit and either establish a time for hearing pursuant 
to Rule 33 or, alternatively, remand to the Trial Court 
for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees and 
Court costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Appellant has failed to marshall all of 
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings 
and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings 
were clearly erroneous, this Court should refuse to 
consider an attack on the Trial Court's distribution of 
property and should summarily dismiss this Appeal. In 
arguendo, a review by this Court of the Trial Court's 
Findings will result in the discovery that the Trial 
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Court applied the standards as outlined in Burt, supra, 
and determined that the premarital portion of the McGinty 
ranch was a joint venture. An examination of the record 
will show that the Trial Court had ample evidence from 
the parties' relationships with one another on the 
acquisition of various parcels of property to support the 
Court's conclusion that the parties functioned as 
partners in various joint venture partnerships prior to 
their marriage and, thus, the Trial Court's decision to 
equally divide the premarital portion of the property 
equally between the parties was not an abuse of 
discretion. Additionally, further analysis of the record 
will show that the Trial Court then analyzed the 
relationship of the parties toward the ranch during the 
time of their marriage and found that each of the parties 
had treated the ranch as a marital asset. Each party 
contributed all of his or her income and time and Lee 
contributed much of her premarital cash into the daily 
operation of the ranch. As such, the Trial Court's 
finding that the marital portion of the McGinty ranch 
should be divided equally between the parties was not 
erroneous and was in compliance with all current caselaw 
which favors an equal distribution of marital assets 
between the parties. 
Appellant urges this Court to ignore all of the 
presumptions outlined by the caselaw and, instead, 
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overturn the Trial Court in favor of a pro rata 
distribution of the ranch. Such a position finds no 
support in the caselaw and relies upon misstatements and 
misinterpretations of fact taken only from one side of 
disputed testimony. In short, Appellant's appeal has 
failed to provide any legal or factual basis to attack 
or overturn the Trial Court's property division. 
Finally, Appellee argues that the entire appeal 
has been maintained solely to delay the recovery and 
resale of the ranch and, thus, deprive her of her fair 
share of the proceeds from its sale. She requests that 
the Court set a time for hearing on the issue of an award 
of her costs and attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or, alternatively, 
that this Court determine that she is entitled to an 
award of her costs and attorney's fee and remand to the 
Trial Court for a determination of the amount of such 
costs and fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April, 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ft 
SfcVfcN I H UI51RICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED JUN 1 8 1993 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY, 
Plaintiff, i 
vs -
LEE McGINTY, ! 
Defendant. : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
: Case No. 91-145 
: Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
This case was tried on June 11, 1993. 
The principal issue before the Court is whether a 
ranch in Castle Vally, Utah (the "Ranch"), purchased by plaintiff 
Selva Eugin McGinty ("Cotton") in 1970 is marital property. 
Cotton met defendant Lee Nash McGinty ("Lee") in 1963, in Saudi 
Arabia, at a time when both were employed by the Arabian American 
Oil Company ("ARAMCO"). A romance blossomed almost immediately, 
but marriage was not possible because of nepotism policies of 
ARAMCO, and because Lee, a devout Catholic, could not marry 
Cotton unless the church granted a dispensation pertaining to his 
earlier marriage. In 1975, the dispensation was received. By 
June, 1976, Cotton and Lee had both retired from ARAMCO, and were 
married. 
Lee presented substantial evidence of her contributions 
to the purchase of the Ranch. Although Cotton claims that she 
only loaned him money, which he subsequently repaid, he presented 
little or no supporting documents for his claims. Furthermore, 
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monthly payments for the Ranch between 1976 and 1983, when it was 
paid offf came out of the ranch account, an account frequently 
supplemented by deposits from the joint accounts of the parties. 
The debt on the Ranch was paid off in 1983 with separate funds of 
Lee. 
Lee contributed to the marriage and the Ranch both with 
her own money and her own effort. The parties lived on the Ranch 
during all of their married life and made substantial improve-
ments to it. The Ranch, purchased for $80,000 in 1970, is now 
estimated to be worth $425,000. Though most of the appreciation 
is due to the market, improvements have doubled hay production 
from the Ranch. 
In previous efforts to sell the Ranch, Cotton acted as 
if Lee were a joint owner of the Ranch. Lee has demonstrated 
that she provided the funds for half of all lump sum payments, 
and installment payments came ultimately from joint funds. The 
Court accordingly concludes that the Ranch is marital property 
even though the title is in Cotton alone. 
The parties agree that, at the time of separation, 
there was $16,000 in a joint account and that Lee had a $14,000 
certificate of deposit. Cotton took control of the $16,000 and 
has consumed it, apparently in violation of the Court's order.1 
'Cotton claims to have expended the monies from day to day operation of the Ranch, a 
use authorized by the Court. However, he paid his attorneys over $7,000 during the same 
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The Court finds that Cotton intentionally violated the Court's 
restraining order and finds him in contempt of the Court. 
Lee maintains that her share of household goods is 
worth $4,000 and that Cotton has disposed of those goods without 
accounting to her for them. 
The Court finds that each of the parties is entitled to 
a decree of divorce because irreconcilable differences have 
arisen between them. The Court awards to each of the parties an 
undivided one-half interest in the Ranch. 
Both parties have agreed that the existing contract for 
sale of the Ranch should be honored. If, however, the contract 
purchaser has not brought his obligations under the contract 
current by August 1, 1993, the Court directs that action be taken 
to recover the Ranch from the defaulting purchaser. In that 
event, the Court will designate Lee as the party with the power 
to control those efforts, and the power to enter into negotiation 
for the resale of the Ranch. The Court has seen both parties on 
the stand and has more confidence in the ability of Lee to handle 
the sale in a business-like manner. If Cotton fails to agree to 
another sale, Lee may seek approval of a sale from the Court. 
The Court finds that the California home once owned by 
Lee was transferred to her brother and sister before the marriage 
time, with no apparent source of that payment. 
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and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Court awards to Lee her certificate of deposit, which it 
finds to be her sole and separate property. The Court awards to 
Cotton the $16,000 account, or its residue, even though it is 
marital property, to foster an equitable distribution of all 
assets of the parties. The Court awards Lee $4,000 from Cotton 
for household goods that have disappeared, the car she is now 
driving, and all other personal property in her possession. 
Cotton is awarded personal property in his possession. 
For his contempt of the Court, Cotton is required to 
pay a civil fine of $200, and to pay Lee, pursuant to Section 78-
32-11, the sum of $1,000 for the expense she incurred in seeking 
to redress the noncompliance. 
The $25,000 held in escrow is divided equally between 
Lee and Cotton. The civil fine and the amounts awarded to Lee 
herein shall be deducted from Cotton's share before distribution 
to him. 
Neither party is awarded alimony, as each has a pension 
from ARAMCO and social security benefits that are adequate, when 
supplemented with the assets awarded hereunder, to provide 
support. Neither party is awarded attorney's fees except as 
provided above. 
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Counsel for Lee is directed to prepare findings, 
conclusions and a decree in conformity with this ruling. 
DATED this /8'- day of June, 1993. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Jvidge 
Case No: 910700145 DA 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the /% — day of ^^UU^JL 17 /r?5 . 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Atty for Plaintiff 
525 EAST 100 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P. O. BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
Atty for Defendant 
FIFTH STREET PLAZA, SUITE 1 
475 EAST MAIN STREET 
PRICE UT 84501 
District Court Clerk 
By: •: >^tcy Z^^LZCJUA^U LA^y 
Deputy Clerk 
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ADDENDUM B 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
©FY 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
LEE McGINTY 
Defendant. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 91-145 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 11th day of June, 1993, the Honorable LYLE 
ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally 
present and represented by his counsel, DAVID S. DOLOWITZ. 
Defendant was personally present and represented by her counsel, 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. The Court received sworn testimony and exhibits 
and, having taken the matter under advisement and having entered 
a Memorandum Decision herein, the Court now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties hereto are residents of Grand County, 
State of Utah, and had been for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. The parties were married on June 18, 1976 at Palo 
Alto, California, and have been husband and wife since that time. 
3. The Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Cotton") 
and the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Lee") met in 1963 
in Saudi Arabia, at a time when both were employed by the Arabian 
American Oil Company ("ARAMCO"). A romance blossomed almost 
immediately, but marriage was not possible because of the nepotism 
policies of ARAMCO and because Lee, a devout Catholic, could not 
marry Cotton unless the church granted a dispensation pertaining 
to Cotton's earlier divorce. In 1975, the dispensation was received 
and by June of 197 6, Cotton and Lee had both retired, or were in 
the process of retiring, from ARAMCO and were finally married. 
4. There have been no children born as the issue of 
this marriage and none are expected. 
5. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
occurred between the parties which makes it impossible for them to 
reconcile their differences and, therefore, the Court finds that 
each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the 
other. 
6. The Court finds that the principle issue before the 
Court is whether a ranch in Castle Valley, Utah (the "Ranch"), 
purchased by Cotton in 1970 is a marital asset. 
7. The Court finds that the parties began looking for 
a retirement home and retirement investments during the late 
1960's. Lee presented substantial evidence of her contributions to 
the purchase of the Ranch with the understanding and belief that 
the Ranch would be her retirement home. Although Cotton claims that 
she only loaned him the money, which he claims he subsequently 
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repaid, he presented little or no supporting documents for his 
claim. 
8. The Court finds that the monthly payments for the 
Ranch between 1976 and 1983, when the Ranch was paid off, came out 
of the Ranch account, an account frequently supplemented by 
deposits from the joint accounts of the parties. The Court further 
finds that the remaining debt on the Ranch of approximately 
FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLARS was paid off in 1983 with 
Lee's separate funds. 
9. The Court finds that Lee contributed to the 
acquisition and the maintenance of the Ranch both before and during 
the marriage and that she did so utilizing her own money as well 
as her efforts. The parties lived on the Ranch during all of their 
married life and made substantial improvements to it. The Ranch, 
purchased for EIGHTY THOUSAND ($80,000.00) DOLLARS in 1970, is now 
estimated to be worth FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND 
($425,000.00) DOLLARS. Though most of the appreciation is due to 
recent market increases, marital improvements have also doubled hay 
production from the Ranch. 
10. In previous efforts to sell the Ranch, Cotton acted 
as if Lee were a joint owner of the Ranch. Lee has signed and 
participated in Listing Agreements and Deeds for the sale of 
portions of the property. Lee has demonstrated that she provided 
the funds for half of the lump sum payments and the Court finds 
that the installment payments ultimately came from joint funds. The 
Court finds that even though the title to the Ranch was held in 
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Cotton's name alone, the Ranch was a joint venture and a marital 
asset and that Lee has made substantial contributions, both before 
and during the marriage, by way of the maintenance, preservation 
and protection of the Ranch in addition to substantial 
contributions of her sole and separate funds. 
11. At the time of separation, the parties agree that 
there was SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLARS in a joint marital 
account and that Lee had a FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLAR 
Certificate of Deposit. The FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLAR 
Certificate of Deposit in Lee's name is the remainder of Lee's pre-
marital savings. The Court finds that Cotton took control of the 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account 
and that he has consumed it, apparently in violation of the Court's 
order. Although Cotton claims to have expended the monies on the 
day-to-day operation of the Ranch, a use authorized by the Court, 
the Court finds that he paid his attorneys over SEVEN THOUSAND 
($7,000.00) DOLLARS during the same time and had no apparent source 
of that payment other than the SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR 
account. 
12. From the evidence, the Court finds that Cotton 
intentionally violated the Court's Restraining Order with respect 
to the disposition of marital assets and finds him in contempt of 
Court. 
13. The Court finds that Lee testified that household 
goods, in addition to those conveyed to the buyer, were disposed 
of by Cotton and that her valuation on those household goods, which 
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were marital assets, was the total sum of EIGHT THOUSAND 
($8,000.00) DOLLARS. She claims that she was entitled to an award 
of FOUR THOUSAND ($4,000.00) DOLLARS for her portion of those 
marital goods. Cotton testified that all of the household goods 
were included in the sale, whether or not listed specifically in 
the sales documents, and, therefore, the Court finds that the 
parties have received fair value for same as part of the sale of 
the ranch. The Court will accept Cotton's testimony on this point 
and will find that the equal division of the proceeds from the sale 
of the ranch would also cover the household goods. 
14. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded an undivided one-half interest in the Ranch and the 
improvements and appurtenances thereto appertaining and/or an 
undivided one-half interest in the Contract of Sale and Trust Deeds 
or mortgages thereon. 
15. The Court finds that Cotton entered into a Contract 
of Sale and that both parties agree that said Contract of Sale for 
the Ranch should be honored. The Court further finds that the 
purchaser of the property is currently in default of his 
obligations. In the event that the contract purchaser has not 
brought his obligations under the contract current by August 1, 
1993, then the Court finds that actions should be taken to recover 
the Ranch from the defaulting purchaser. In that event, the Court 
finds that Lee is the more appropriate party to exercise the power 
to control the enforcement of the contract and that she should be 
authorized to take all steps necessary to enforce the contract or 
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recover the property and further that she be empowered to enter 
into negotiations for the resale of the Ranch, should that be 
necessary. The Court has seen both parties on the stand and finds 
that it has more confidence in the ability of Lee to handle the 
sale in a business-like manner. If Cotton fails to agree to another 
sale of the Ranch or to enforcement of the Contract of Sale, the 
Court finds that Lee should be authorized to seek approval for 
enforcement or a sale directly from the Court. 
16. The Court finds that Lee's one-half interest in the 
California home was transferred by Lee to her brother and sister 
before her marriage to Cotton and, therefore, is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court and is not a marital asset. 
17. The Court finds that Lee should be awarded her 
Certificate of Deposit which the Court finds to be her sole and 
separate property. 
18. The Court finds that Cotton should be awarded the 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account, 
or its residue, even though it is marital property, in order to 
foster an equitable distribution of all of the assets of the 
parties. 
19. The Court finds that Lee should be awarded the 
Lincoln automobile which she is now driving and all of the other 
personal property in her possession. Cotton should be awarded those 
items of personal property in his possession at this time. 
20. For his contempt of Court, the Court finds that 
Cotton should be required to pay a civil fine in the of TWO HUNDRED 
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($200,00) DOLLARS and that he should further be required to pay to 
Lee the sum of ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS for the expenses 
she has incurred in seeking to address his non-compliance with the 
Court order pursuant to Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated. 
21. The Court finds that there is a sum in excess of 
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($25,000.00) DOLLARS currently being held in 
an escrow account in the names of the attorneys of record herein 
on behalf of their respective parties. The funds in said escrow 
represent funds received from the sale of the Ranch. Additionally, 
the parties have deposited the 1991 tax refund in the sum of EIGHT 
HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE ($855.00) DOLLARS and have additional earned 
interest on the account. The Court finds that the escrow account 
should be equally divided between Lee and Cotton but that the civil 
fine and the amounts owed to Lee from Cotton should be deducted 
from Cotton's share before distribution to him of his share of the 
escrow account. 
22. The Court finds that each of the parties hereto has 
a pension from ARAMCO and social security benefits and that each 
of the parties has received an equal share of the assets awarded 
herein and, therefore, each party is self-supporting. Neither party 
is awarded alimony. 
23. Based upon the distribution of assets herein, the 
Court finds that each of the parties is able to meet his or her 
respective Court costs and attorney's fees and neither party is 
awarded same herein. 
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24. The Defendant desires to have her prior name of Lee 
Nash restored to her and it is appropriate for the Court to do so. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the Plaintiff 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. No alimony is awarded herein to either party. 
3. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and 
personal property during this marriage and in the years leading up 
to same and said property is awarded as follows: 
A. Each of the parties hereto is awarded an 
undivided one-half interest, as tenants-in-common, in the McGinty 
Ranch located in Castle Valley, Grand County, State of Utah and all 
of the appurtenances thereto appertaining and/or in the Contract 
of Sale and security instruments concerning said Ranch and all of 
the proceeds which result therefrom. In the event that the 
purchaser of the Ranch brings the contract current no later than 
August 1, 1993 and keeps same in good standing, then the parties 
hereto are each awarded one-half of all of the benefits from said 
contract. In the event that the purchaser under the contract fails 
to bring his obligations current by August 1, 1993 or subsequently 
defaults in the terms of the agreement, then Defendant Lee McGinty 
is authorized to assume control and take all steps necessary to 
reclaim the Ranch and/or enforce the sale contract on behalf of the 
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parties hereto. She is further empowered to enter into negotiations 
for the resale of the Ranch if that should be necessary. In the 
event that the Plaintiff fails to agree to the terms of a future 
sale, Defendant may seek approval of the Court to confirm a resale 
or enforce the Contract of Sale. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded the SIXTEEN THOUSAND 
($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account, or the residue 
thereof. 
C. The Defendant is awarded her time Certificate 
of Deposit in the sum of approximately FOURTEEN THOUSAND 
($14,000.00) DOLLARS. 
D. The Defendant is awarded the Lincoln automobile 
in her possession and the Plaintiff is awarded the vehicles which 
were left in his possession at the time of separation but which he 
has apparently sold. Each party is awarded those items of personal 
property in his or her possession as of the date hereof. 
E. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
escrow account which holds the proceeds from the down payment for 
the Ranch and the 1991 tax refund provided, however, that the 
Plaintiff's share shall be reduced as follows: 
(1) TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS to be paid 
to the Court for and as Plaintiff's civil fine for contempt; and 
(2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) 
DOLLARS to be paid to the Defendant for and as reimbursement for 
her costs incurred in readdressing Plaintiff's contempt; and 
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4. Neither party is awarded Court costs or attorney's 
fees herein. 
5. The Court concludes from the findings that the 
Plaintiff has committed a civil contempt of Court and fines the 
Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS by way of civil 
contempt fee to be paid from Plaintiff's share of the escrow 
proceeds awarded herein. 
6. The Defendant's prior name of Lee Nash is hereby 
restored to her. 
DATED t h i s IftfK day of M/Ctsc, T 1993. 
ft,.L M 
pn& R. ANDERSON " ^ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH i
 M 
COUNTY OF GRAND J 
I. th. undar»gnad Clark of * • *•*•«* Judlcml 
Court in and for Grand County. Stata at Utah. «•"•/»"» 
ecrtrfy that the annexed and foregoing la a true, lull and 
correct eooy or an original document on flla in my omoe 
as »uch Clark. . ^ 2 2 ^ 
WITNESS my hand the seal o« said Court this /<? " 
day ^  (l^CU^t rt._&2 
Clark 
D * 5 5 t y ^ T 
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COPY 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE McGINTY 
Defendant. 
1 DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 91-145 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the nth day of June, 1993, the Honorable LYLE 
ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally 
present and represented by his counsel, DAVID S. DOLOWITZ. 
Defendant was personally present and represented by her counsel, 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. The Court received sworn testimony and exhibits 
and, having taken the matter under advisement and having entered 
a Memorandum Decision herein and having entered the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the Plaintiff 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. No alimony is awarded herein to either party. 
3. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and 
personal property during this marriage and in the years leading up 
to same and said property is awarded as follows: 
A. Each of the parties hereto is awarded an 
undivided one-half interest, as tenants-in-common, in the McGinty 
Ranch located in Castle Valley, Grand County, State of Utah and all 
of the appurtenances thereto appertaining and/or in the Contract 
of Sale and security instruments concerning said Ranch and all of 
the proceeds which result therefrom. In the event that the 
purchaser of the Ranch brings the contract current no later than 
August 1, 1993 and keeps same in good standing, then the parties 
hereto are each awarded one-half of all of the benefits from said 
contract. In the event that the purchaser under the contract fails 
to bring his obligations current by August 1, 1993 or subsequently 
defaults in the terms of the agreement, then Defendant Lee McGinty 
is authorized to assume control and take all steps necessary to 
reclaim the Ranch and/or enforce the sale contract on behalf of the 
parties hereto. She is further empowered to enter into negotiations 
for the resale of the Ranch if that should be necessary. In the 
event that the Plaintiff fails to agree to the terms of a future 
sale, Defendant may seek approval of the Court to confirm a resale 
or enforce the Contract of Sale. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded the SIXTEEN THOUSAND 
($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account, or the residue 
thereof. 
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C. The Defendant is awarded her time Certificate 
of Deposit in the sum of approximately FOURTEEN THOUSAND 
($14,000.00) DOLLARS. 
D. The Defendant is awarded the Lincoln automobile 
in her possession and the Plaintiff is awarded the vehicles which 
were left in his possession at the time of separation but which he 
has apparently sold. Each party is awarded those items of personal 
property in his or her possession as of the date hereof. 
E. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
escrow account which holds the proceeds from the down payment for 
the Ranch and the 1991 tax refund provided, however, that the 
Plaintiff's share shall be reduced as follows: 
(1) TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS to be paid 
to the Court for and as Plaintiff's civil fine for contempt; and 
(2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) 
DOLLARS to be paid to the Defendant for and as reimbursement for 
her costs incurred in readdressing Plaintiff's contempt; and 
4. Neither party is awarded Court costs or attorney's 
fees herein. 
5. The Court concludes from the findings that the 
Plaintiff has committed a civil contempt of Court and fines the 
Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS by way of civil 
contempt fee to be paid from Plaintiff's share of the escrow 
proceeds awarded herein. 
6. The Defendant's prior name of Lee Nash is hereby 
restored to her. 
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W/£. '* ^ day of HJA//1. st. T 1993. y/fr/4 
<WX£ R. ANDERS'Q 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH l
 M «l 
COUNTY OF ORAND I 
I. tn . tmdaralonad Clark of tha ^ ^ V r S S J 
Court in and for Grand County. Stata of Utah. Jo£afa*y 
corttfy that tha anna«ad and foregone •«$ a tnia.fuHand 
eerrtct copy ot an ordinal document r:. U\m m my offloa 
as such Clark. j * "Ch 
WITNES^flsy tend tha t»£ -»' ca: •"• -J*J « • — ^ L - T 
day 1 (JUlirjUJut. 19. J M 
0 ^ Clarlt 
ft 
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ADDENDUM C 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SELVA EUGIN MCGINTY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
Vs. ; 
LEE MCGINTY, 
De fendant/Appe11ee. ] 
> AFFIDAVIT OF JOANE 
I PAPPAS WHITE, ATTORNEY 
> FOR LEE NASH 
l Case No. 930569-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Carbon ) 
I, Joane Pappas White, being first duly sworn upon 
oath hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am attorney for Lee Nash formerly known as 
Lee McGinty and have been her attorney throughout the trial 
and appellate stages of this case. 
2. The Decree of Divorce entered on August 11, 
1993 authorized Lee Nash to takes steps necessary to reclaim 
the McGinty ranch in the event that the defaulting buyer did 
not cure the default by August 1, 1993. 
3. The defaulting buyer, Darr Morell Hatch, Jr. 
has failed to make any additional payments whatsoever since 
the time of trial and yet he still remains in possession of 
the McGinty ranch as of the date hereof. 
4. Lee Nash has retained the services of 
Southeastern Utah Title Company for purposes of proceeding 
with a foreclosure of the trust deed on the property but that 
said title company, as well as others contacted, would not 
proceed without the written authorization of Selva McGinty. 
5. Requests were made by me to Mr. McGinty's 
current counsel with respect to signing documents necessary 
for the foreclosure but such documents were not forthcoming. 
6. An Order to Show Cause requiring Selva McGinty 
to execute documents for the foreclosure was filed with the 
court on December 8, 1993. Just prior to the date of the 
hearing, I received notification from Mr. McGinty's attorney 
that he would sign a stipulation agreeing that Mr. McGinty 
would execute documents to facilitate the foreclosure. A delay 
of thirty-four (34) days existed from the filing of the Order 
until the signing of the Stipulation. 
7. Documents authorizing the foreclosure were 
prepared by the title company and were forwarded to attorney 
Tucker for the signature of Selva McGinty on March 21, 1994. 
In my letter of March 28, 1994 I requested that attorney 
Hansen return the materials for the Title Company within ten 
(10) days. The documents have never been returned and the 
title company sent the attached letter indicating that they 
are unable to proceed with the foreclosure due to the failure 
by Mr. McGinty to return the Substitution of Trustee document. 
From the date of the Order to Show Cause until the current 
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time almost five (5) months have passed and neither Mr. 
McGinty nor his lawyer have made any attempt to get the 
documents to the title company even though a Stipulation and 
Order requiring them to do so was entered months ago. (See 
attached letter from South Eastern Utah Title Company). 
8. To the best of our information and belief Mr. 
McGinty has made no attempt to regain control of the McGinty 
ranch and he remains a close personal friend of Darr Hatch 
and is residing in a trailer park which Mr. Hatch manages. 
9. For a period of the past six (6) months, an 
alternative buyer has been waiting for the opportunity to 
purchase the McGinty ranch and stands ready, willing and able 
to execute purchase agreements immediately for the ranch 
property. 
10. In my opinion, Mr. McGinty has done everything 
possible to delay the foreclosure proceeding and to stall the 
execution of documents necessary to reclaim the property from 
Darr Hatch. 
DATED thiscSC*^ day of April, 1994. 
~^*Q1C; 
WHITE " JOpE^PftPPAS 
Attorney for Appellee 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
April, 1994. 
Residing At: 
My Commission Expires: 
JUDY SANSLOW 
I ^ r f e 5 9 9 NORTH 430 WEST 
m*nwW—PHIUk,UIAH 84501 
COMM. EXP. 4-17-98 
{)Q^r^m I B l f ^ M — K M IJfeafeMt *EJEEME\ ^gMJPABffil? 
• SAN JUAN COUNTY 
P.O. BOX 579 
MONTICELLO, UTAH 84535 
(801) 587-2588 
FAX (801) 587-2582 
April 21, 1994 
ABSTRACTS AND TITLE INSURANCE 
CARBON, EMERY, GRAND, & SAN JUAN COUNTIES 
• CARBON/EMERY COUNTY 
175 EAST 100 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 855 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
(801) 637-4455 
FAX (801) 637-4459 
Joane Pappas White Esq. 
475 East Main, Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
RE; McGinty 
Dear Joane: 
• GRAND COUNTY 
150 EAST 100 NORTH 
P.O BOX 700 
MOAB, UTAH 84532 
(801) 259-7635 
FAX (801) 259-7637 
As of this date, I have not received the Substitution of Trustee document signed by Mr. 
McGinty. From your letter of March 28, you gave McGinty's attorney 10 days to return the 
Substitution to me. It may be a good time to urge Mr. McGinty's attorney to send that to 
me. As soon as I get the Substitution, we will proceed with the forclosure. 
Best Regardsi 
Jerry Frandsen 
ADDENDUM D 
EXHIBITS 36, 37, 38 & 39 
TRACING FUNDS WHICH PAID OFF RANCH 
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ADDENDUM E 
RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
4 1 1 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 33 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages shouJd not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
to make express the authority of the court to 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
sis for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaractenzed and mis-
stated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he in-
vestigated plaintiff's malpractice action 
against defendant orthodontist and found that 
he could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. 
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